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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We employ a hand-collected unique dataset on banks operating in China between 2003 and 
2011 to investigate the impact of board governance features (size, composition and 
functioning) on bank efficiency and risk taking. Our evidence suggests that board 
characteristics tend to have a greater influence on banks’ profit and cost efficiency than on 
loan quality. We find that the proportion of female directors on the board appears not only to 
be linked to higher profit and cost efficiency but also to lower traditional banking risk. 
Similarly, board independence is associated with higher profit efficiency of banks; while the 
opposite is found for executive directors and in the presence of dual leadership of the 
CEO/chairperson. Among the control variables, we found that liquidity negatively affects 
profit and cost efficiency, while positively affecting risk. Interestingly, we find some 
evidence of an incremental effect of specific board characteristics on efficiency for banks 
with more concentrated ownership structures and state-owned institutions; while for banks 
with CEO performance-related pay schemes the effect on efficiency when significant is 
usually negative. Our results offer useful insights to policy makers in China charged with the 
task of improving the governance mechanisms in banking institutions. 
  
Keywords: Board governance; Bank efficiency; Asset quality; Bank ownership; Performance-
related compensation; Chinese banking sector. 
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1. Introduction 
China’s financial sector experienced rapid growth during the past three decades and has 
gradually transformed its largely planned economy to a more market-oriented system. The 
intense deregulation and restructuring process that started in the second half of the 1990s and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) entry in 2001 have resulted in radical reforms and 
greater openness to the outside world. The banking sector in China has long been controlled 
by the four major state-owned banks and over recent years it has been revived by government 
capital injections, privatisations and foreign ownership (e.g. Garcia-Herrero et al., 2006; 
Berger et al., 2009). In 2014, four out of the ten largest banks in the world by market 
capitalisation were Chinese, of which three are currently in the list of Globally Systemically 
Important Banks (GSIBs) that, since 2011, is compiled and updated each year by the 
Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2014). 
Notwithstanding the country’s fast growing economy and financial market 
developments (Shanghai and ShenZhen stock exchanges combined today represent the 
world’s second-largest exchange), the Chinese banking sector is still the most important 
financing channel for the local economy. However, a number of studies have highlighted the 
legacy and persistence of China’s weak legal environment and institutions, particularly in 
terms of investor protection systems, corporate governance, accounting standards and quality 
of government (Allen et al., 2008).  
The benefits of healthy governance frameworks are well known (Claessen & Yurtoglu, 
2013) and include better performance and efficiency, greater access to financing, lower cost 
of capital, and a more favourable treatment of all stakeholders. Equally, poor corporate 
governance can increase risks by affecting the quality of bank assets and causing financial 
volatility, and are often associated with lack of transparency. The failure and distress 
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conditions of many banking firms post-global financial crisis have reignited the debate over 
the governance frameworks of these institutions and their impact on performance and risk-
taking activities (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Mulbert, 2010; Adams & Mehran, 2012). As a result, the 
international regulatory bodies have issued new principles for enhancing sound corporate 
governance within the banking sector at a global level (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2010). In China, specifically, one of the most recent objectives of the 
authorities’ reforms was the establishment of a board of directors’ system aimed at improving 
banks’ corporate governance structures by setting standards for the composition, structure 
and responsibilities of the board members (see Section 2 for more details). 
The contributions of this study are threefold. Firstly, the literature on bank corporate 
governance in emerging markets is typically limited and existing studies largely focus on 
non-financial firms (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). This is because corporate governance in 
banks differs in many respects from that in other firms not least because of their (the banks’) 
business complexity, transparency, regulation and multitude of stakeholders (Mehran et al., 
2011). Researchers have recently turned their attention to these themes both in the developed 
and developing worlds (e.g. Laeven & Levin, 2009; Barry et al., 2011; Pathan & Faff, 2013; 
Berger et al., 2014a, b). However, data availability is usually limited, particularly in emerging 
markets, and this largely explains the scarcity of studies. In addition, while a number of 
studies have investigated the board structure-performance relationship in banking using 
traditional accounting indicators (e.g. de Andres & Vallelado, 2008 and Pathan & Faff, 2013; 
and, for the Chinese banking sector, Liang et al., 2013), only a few have examined it within a 
stochastic frontier framework that allows the estimation of profit- and cost-efficiency levels.
1
 
                                                          
1
 The classical approach to the evaluation of bank performance concentrates on financial ratios such as return on 
assets and cost/income ratio. However, these fail to capture the multidimensional character of banks’ production 
process and to control for the differences in input/output prices and other exogenous market factors.  In recent 
5 
 
 
Secondly, in this research, we hand-collected a unique dataset concerning board 
structures (size, composition and functioning), ownership features and CEO pay for a sample 
of banks operating in China between 2003 and 2011.  To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to examine these effects on both profit and cost efficiency in the context of an 
emerging market, and particularly for Chinese banks, and to extend the investigation to the 
risk-taking behaviour. Efficiency is estimated using parametric stochastic frontier 
methodology both on the profit and cost sides; while risk is measured as the ratio of non-
performing loans (NPLs) over total loans. We employ the two-step system dynamic 
Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) approach with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors 
to control for potential endogeneity and test the robustness of our results by using alternative 
definitions of banks’ inputs and outputs for the estimation of the best-practice frontiers.  
Our evidence suggests that board characteristics tend to influence banks’ profit and cost 
efficiency more than loan quality does. We find that the proportion of female directors on the 
board appears not only to be linked to greater profit and cost efficiency but also to lower 
traditional banking risk. Similarly, board independence is associated with banks’ higher profit 
efficiency while the opposite is found for executive directors and in the presence of dual 
leadership of the CEO/chairperson. Among the control variables, state-owned banks show 
higher cost efficiency than non-state owned banks.  The bank liquidity ratio is the most 
significant in reducing profit and cost efficiency and increasing risk. This is an important 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
years, academic research has increasingly focused on frontier analysis to measure the performance of banks and 
other financial institutions. Many studies (e.g. Fried et al, 1993; Bauer et al., 1998; Cummins & Weiss, 2000) 
have argued that frontier efficiency measures yield more accurate estimates of the underlying performance of 
financial firms. 
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finding as prudential regulators are increasingly focusing on banks’ liquidity requirements in 
the aftermath of the global crisis. 
The third contribution of this paper lies in providing an empirical investigation of the 
incremental effect of board governance features on banks’ efficiency levels and traditional 
banking risk under different conditions, namely i) the level of ownership concentration; ii) 
state vs private ownership; and iii) the presence of CEO performance-related compensation 
schemes. We find that the incremental effects of board governance structures for banks 
characterised by concentrated ownership, when significant, are usually positive (as in the case 
executive and independent directors), whereas results for risk are always insignificant. Our 
evidence further shows that the same two specific board composition variables have also a 
positive incremental impact on bank efficiency in the case of state owned institutions. 
Interestingly, for banks with CEO performance-related pay the effect on efficiency when 
significant is usually negative. 
Our findings are consistent with alternative efficiency measures and provide important 
policy insights regarding bank governance in emerging markets where minority investor 
protection is particularly weak.   The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide an 
overview of the key recent reforms in Chinese banking. In Section 3 we review the relevant 
literature and formulate the main hypotheses. Section 4 provides a detailed description of the 
sample, data and methodological approach. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings, and 
Section 6 concludes.    
 
2. Key reforms in the Chinese banking sector  
Since the late 1970s, the Chinese government has implemented gradual but far-reaching 
reforms to address the institutional, organisational and political problems faced by its banking 
sector. One was the change from the mono-banking system into a plural-banking system 
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consisting of a central bank and a variety of banking institutions; the other was the transition 
from a specialised to a commercial banking system (Avery et al., 2011). The reform process 
can be broadly divided into three distinct time periods (e.g. Berger et al., 2009; Fu & 
Heffernan, 2009). From 1978 to the early 1990s, four large state-owned banks were re-
established or separated from the country’s central bank (People’s Bank of China, PBOC) 
from which they took over the commercial banking business. In the mid-80s, several new 
joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs) also entered the market.  
The second wave of reforms occurred in the 1990s up until the entry of China to the 
WTO and was focused on encouraging state-owned banks to implement market-oriented 
practices. Three policy banks were created to separate policy-directed lending from the Big 
Four
2
; 112 City Commercial Banks (CCBs) were also established by city governments 
through the restructuring and active merging of over 5000 urban cooperative banks. In 
addition, the Central Bank Law and the Commercial Banking Law were enacted to enhance 
the independence of the central bank and commercial banks; the government injected capital 
and reduced non-performing loans in an attempt to repair the balance sheets of the state-
owned banks. Furthermore, foreign banks were allowed to carry out basic functions in China, 
although there were many restrictions in place until after the country joined the WTO in 2001.  
The third period includes the early 2000s up until the most current years when speed of 
reforms accelerated with the aim of enhancing the reputation and the international 
competiveness of the Chinese banking sector. In March 2003 the government transferred the 
central bank’s supervisory and regulatory functions to the China Banking Regulatory 
                                                          
2
 The “Big Four” are the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank 
(CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and they are often referred to as State-owned 
Commercial Banks (SOCB). The three policy banks created in 1994 are the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China (ADBC), China Development Bank (CDB), and the Export-Import Bank of China (Chexim). 
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Commission (CBRC). Since its inception, the CBRC has focused on critical areas such as 
accounting requirements and standards for loan classifications, capital adequacy, risk 
management and internal controls, and corporate governance.  
 
2.1 Recent progress in the Chinese bank governance frameworks: a bird’s eye view 
The CBRC has been particularly active in relation to the policy framework for bank 
corporate governance and over the past ten years it promulgated several important 
guidelines.3 Among the key aims were to enhance internal management and controls and 
standardise banks’ board structures with the intention to create boards as ‘strong’ and 
functional as those in developed countries (Liang et al., 2013). As a result, Chinese banks 
have made great progress in the establishment of a board system, gradually introducing an 
independent director system and a specialised committee system and laying the foundations 
for the board’s independence and effective operations. Nowadays, almost all Chinese banks 
have followed the guidelines and have adopted a four-tier governance system that includes 
shareholders’ general meeting, board of directors, board of supervisors, and senior 
management where the shareholder meeting has the ultimate power to select directors and 
supervisors. The board of directors in Chinese banks is typically composed of the executive 
directors, the full-time non-executive directors, and the part-time independent directors 
                                                          
3
 Specifically, in 2005, the CBRC promulgated the “Guidelines for Board of Directors Code of Conduct of Joint 
Stock Commercial Banks” and in 2006 the “Guidelines to Corporate Governance of State-owned Commercial 
Banks and the Relevant Supervision”; and the “Guidelines on Internal Audit of Banking Institutions”. These 
guidelines, as stated in the CBRC website, function as both an elaboration of and a supplement to the 
“Guidance on the Corporate Governance of Joint Stock Commercial Banks” and “Guidance on Independent 
Directors and External Supervisors of Joint Stock Commercial Banks” issued by the People’s Bank of China in 
2002.  
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(Cossin & Lu, 2013).  In addition, banks were required by the CBRC to establish several 
special committees, including a strategic development committee, an audit committee, a risk 
management committee, a personnel and remuneration committee, and a connected transition 
control committee, all under the board of directors. 
Table 1 presents selected examples of the board composition for different types of 
Chinese banks. The supervisory board is established alongside that of directors to exercise 
checks on the management team and board of directors.
4
 Under the leadership of the board of 
directors, the senior management team executes strategy and is responsible for its daily 
operation and management activities.  
 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
 
The latest CBRC regulations (2013) “Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
Commercial Banks” (referred to in official documents as The Guidelines) were promulgated 
to address existing problems in the corporate governance of the banking institutions and with 
reference to the experiences of international regulatory reforms since the global financial 
crisis of 2007-08.
5
 
Over the past decade the Chinese authorities also implemented another important 
strategy to improve banks’ corporate governance, with the aim of encouraging banks to adopt 
a more diversified shareholding ownership structure.  Under this strategy, two main 
approaches were initially pursued in exchange for more effective monitoring. The first was to 
                                                          
4
 Unlike German banks, the supervisory board in Chinese banks does not take major business decisions, but 
serves as a monitoring organ (Xiao et al., 2004). 
5
 The document summarises the practices and experiences in the supervision of Chinese banking institutions and 
maps out the future direction for the development of sound corporate governance for banks operating in China. 
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sell strategic stakes to foreign investors. Introducing foreign strategic investment leads to a 
more diversified ownership structure, which in turn increases the pressure of banks to 
improve their internal governance system (Hasan & Xie, 2013). Meanwhile, it has been 
observed (Berger et al., 2009) that the foreign strategic investment also allows the investors 
to directly participate in banks’ management by occupying one or two seats on the 
management board and this direct involvement can enhance information transparency and 
strengthen bank management. 
The second approach was to encourage banks to become listed on Chinese and foreign 
exchanges through initial public offering (IPOs). For example, by the end of 2014, there were 
21 Chinese banks listed on domestic stock exchanges and/or the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. 
Among them, 14 Chinese banks launched IPOs during our sample period, 2003-2011. Two of 
the most favourable effects of bank IPOs were the improvement of information disclosure 
and allowing market forces to act as an effective discipline mechanism on bank performance.  
 
 
3. Conceptual framework and empirical hypotheses 
Over the past decade or so, banks’ corporate governance has received increasing 
academic interest both in the developed and emerging worlds (see, for example, the recent 
surveys by de Haan and Vlahu, 2013; and Hagendorff, 2014). However, only a handful of 
recent studies examine the relationship between governance, bank efficiency and risk taking 
and these typically focus on the US and European banking sectors. Indeed a few studies have 
examined the impact of alternative bank board characteristics on either different measures of 
accounting performance (de Andres & Vallelado 2008; Adams & Mehran, 2012; Pathan & 
Faff, 2013); operating efficiency (Jiang et al., 2009; Agoraki et al., 2010; Tanna et al., 2011); 
or risk (Pathan, 2009; Berger et al., 2014). Overall, evidence suggests that effective 
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governance measured in terms of relative bank performance is more likely to occur in small, 
independent and well-diversified boards, albeit such “strong” boards may not be optimal for 
banking firms if they translate to a greater risk propensity.  
A strengthened board structure should mitigate the agency problems and align the 
interests between shareholders and managers as well as help enhance the monitoring effect 
over the CEO’s and managers’ decision making. This would include decisions regarding 
banks’ operations such as the selection of inputs and outputs, which directly influence banks’ 
efficiency levels and are also related to risk taking. It would therefore be reasonable to 
assume that enhanced board structures and decision-making processes will positively affect 
the quality of bank management and banks’ frontier efficiency scores, which derive from 
sophisticated techniques to assess performance (e.g. Bauer et al., 1998).  
In this short review, we first examine a set of board characteristics (size, composition 
and functioning) that are deemed to significantly impact on bank efficiency and risk taking. 
Then we concentrate on studies focusing on the importance of ownership structures and pay-
for-performance incentive schemes for bank efficiency and risk.  
 
3.1 Board governance: size, composition and functioning 
3.1.1 Board size 
In relation to board size, the standard argument (Jensen, 1993; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003) is that the larger the board, the less effective it is at monitoring management. This is 
because of greater agency costs, particularly in terms of free-riding problems among 
directors, coordination and communication difficulties, and greater and longer decision-
making time. The empirical evidence, though, is mixed (Adams & Mehran, 2003, 2008, 
2008; Aebi et al., 2012). Several studies observe that larger boards may be needed in large 
financial institutions to reflect the complexities of their business models, to increase the pool 
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of expertise and resources available, and to increase the potential of establishing contacts 
with diverse customers and depositors (Dalton et al., 1999).
6
  In a comprehensive review of 
UK banks’ corporate governance, Walker (2009) notes that banks should aim for an ‘ideal’ 
size of 10-12 members; while Ladipo & Nestor (2012) indicate that the best performing 
European banks have smaller and more 'mature' boards. Also Pathan & Fuff (2013) reveal 
that US banks with a small board have superior financial performance.  
In light of these considerations, we adopt a view similar to that of Grove et al. (2011), 
which contends that banks can benefit from large boards in terms of performance up to a 
certain point. Thereafter the relationship becomes negative due to the lack of efficient 
monitoring by the board, organisational difficulties, and greater agency problems.
7
 Based on 
this, our first hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1. (H1): The relationship between board size, bank efficiency and loan quality is 
concave (inverted U-shaped). 
 
3.1.2 Board composition (female, foreign, executive, and independent) 
 In addition to size, board diversity has often been associated with better firm 
performance, quality of earnings and/or lower risk-taking propensity. As we will see in this 
                                                          
6
 One case in point is bank holding companies (US’s BHCs) that comprise a number of subsidiaries that have 
their own boards of directors. To facilitate coordination and monitoring, these subsidiaries should be represented 
on the holding companies’ boards. 
7
 Standard accounting-based measures of performance similar to those used in Grove et al. (2011) do not 
consider input prices and output mix and ignore the market value of the bank. However, cost and profit 
efficiency scores can help enhance the performance evaluation of the banks. Therefore, in this context, we 
assume the same reasoning applied to performance be valid in the case of profit and cost efficiency. 
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section, the existing empirical evidence is mixed, but banking authorities and policy makers 
globally are actively implementing policies to encourage banks to promote heterogeneity in 
the boardroom. This study tests the general hypothesis that boards characterised by more 
diverse and more independent directors are better at monitoring bank managers, thereby 
resulting in more efficient and less risky banking institutions, as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The presence of more diverse and independent boards is positively related 
to bank and loan quality. 
 
If greater diversity in the composition of the board is expected to enhance bank 
efficiency and loan quality, it is also plausible to expect that the potential combined effect of 
having more diversity (i.e. a greater proportion of female, foreign, executive and/or 
independent directors) be driven by single components of the board. Therefore, we also 
formulate four separate hypotheses (H2a-H2d), one for each of these factors. The first is 
gender diversity. 
A higher proportion of females on boards has often been found to affect governance 
dynamics in several meaningful ways. Nonetheless, the evidence on the impact on firm 
performance and risk is far from straightforward. Kanter (1977) suggests that performance 
advantages will result only when the proportion of women in the boardroom achieves the sort 
of ‘critical mass’ that will allow them to ‘form coalitions, support one another and affect the 
culture of the group’. Other studies found a positive relationship between a higher proportion 
of female directors and accounting performance (Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Catalyst, 2004). In a study on gender diversity in an Asian context, Kang et al. (2010) find 
that investors’ reactions to women appointed as directors in publicly listed firms in Singapore 
is positive. Yet, recent research has revealed that a greater proportion of female directors 
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negatively influences firm value either because of excess monitoring (Adams & Ferreira, 
2007) or due to lack of experience, as in the natural experiment conducted by Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) on Norwegian firms. Concerning gender differences in risk attitude, research 
in organisational psychology and economics well documents that, on average, women 
naturally tend to be more risk-averse than men. The related literature for the specific banking 
sector is very limited. Interestingly, a recent study by Berger et al. (2014b) finds that in the 
three years following the increase in female board representation, risk taking increases for 
banks in Germany, although the economic impact is marginal. Given the above, our 
hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The presence of more female directors on the boards positively affects 
bank efficiency and loan quality. 
 
There are also potential benefits of including foreign directors on a board. Masulis et al. 
(2012) argue that the advisory ability of the board can be enhanced through their extensive 
experience and knowledge of foreign markets and their networking connections. However, 
the presence of foreign directors may also weaken the effectiveness of monitoring due to the 
substantial oversight costs of on-site visits and attending meetings that they incur. Foreign 
directors may not be familiar with the local systems that makes it difficult for them to play a 
monitoring role as a component of the corporate governance mechanism. This could be due 
to either lack of knowledge of local markets or barriers posed by language, culture and 
regulations. Consistent with Adams et al.’s (2010) survey, Masulis et al. (2012) show that 
foreign directors have a lower attendance rate at board meetings, and firms with foreign 
directors tend to have a lower return on assets. In contrast, Berger et al. (2009) and Liang et 
al. (2013) maintain that foreign directors on the boards of Chinese banks can potentially 
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contribute to better performance by bringing new technology and managerial techniques and 
skills. We endorse this view and express hypothesis 2b as: 
 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The presence of more foreign directors on the boards positively affects 
bank efficiency and loan quality. 
 
De Andres & Vallelado (2008) observe that efficient boards should also have a good 
proportion of executive directors. This is because they facilitate the transfer of information 
between board directors and management and have specific knowledge of the banking 
institution that could effectively complement the abilities of the non-executive directors.  The 
main concern is that the monitoring of top managers may be weakened when executives also 
act as directors and this, in turn, may result in higher internal governance costs. Nevertheless, 
the empirical evidence is generally ambiguous. Executive directors on a board may be of 
benefit to the implementation of a firm’s business operations and strategies due to their 
greater knowledge or experience, which by implication can improve firms’ efficiency or 
performance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Bhagat & Black, 1998). Stock markets have 
also been found to respond positively to announcements of appointments of non-executive 
directors (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Cotter et al., 1997) and positive effects on the firm’s 
accounting performance have been documented by, among others, O’Connell and Cramer 
(2010) and Liang et al. (2013). However, Hermalin & Weisbach (1991), Dulewicz & Herbert 
(2004), and de Andres & Vallelado (2008) do not reach this conclusion; for example, these 
authors show that an optimum combination of executive and non-executive directors is a 
necessary condition for firm value. Nonetheless, in this study we hypothesise that:  
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Hypothesis 2c (H2c): The presence of more executive directors on the boards positively 
affects bank efficiency and loan quality. 
 
We also consider board independence as one of the critical features that may impact 
Chinese banks’ efficiency and risk-taking activity. There are several theoretical motives as to 
why greater independence of directors may be beneficial to the effectiveness of the board; for 
these we can be refer back to the seminal works by Fama (1980) and Fama & Jensen (1983). 
One line of argument emphasises the role of the incentives that independent directors have to 
protect their reputation in the market for independent directorships in the banking sector. This 
should make them more effective at monitoring and disciplining managers, reducing 
opportunistic costs, and protecting shareholders’ interests. Board independence is expected to 
have a positive effect on firm performance (Pathan et al., 2007), although empirical studies 
do not appear to always confirm this prediction (e.g. Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Skully, 2002; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Park & Shin, 2004). In fact, various studies (e.g. Adam & 
Ferreira, 2007) have highlighted some of the drawbacks of having independent directors if, 
for example, their presence weakens the propensity of the CEO to share information with the 
board. Studies on the banking sector seem to support this latter view and provide evidence of 
lower performance (e.g. Minton et al., 2011; Adams & Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al., 2012; 
Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012), and lower risk taking (Pathan, 2009; 
Mongiardino & Christian, 2010; Minton et al., 2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul & Yerramilli, 
2013). The hypothesis we test in this study predicts a positive effect on both efficiency and 
loan quality and can be expressed as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2d (H2d): The presence of more independent directors on the boards positively 
affects bank efficiency and loan quality. 
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3.1.3 Board functioning (CEO duality and frequency of meetings) 
Another important characteristic of the boardroom is the dual appointment of the CEO 
and Chairman of the board. There are two opposing arguments in the literature on the 
potential effects on firms’ operations and performance. On one hand, the agency theorists 
argue against CEO duality because it weakens the monitoring powers of the boards and it 
increases internal governance costs as well as risks. According to this view (e.g. Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Lasfer, 2006), duality enables CEOs to leverage their power for 
their own personal outcomes, an effect that has recently been associated by some authors 
(Dey et al., 2011) with the ‘entrenchment theory’. On the other hand, the stewardship or 
organisation theorists (e.g. Anderson & Anthony, 1986) contend that combined leadership 
structures at the corporate top can decrease information costs and improve stability, thereby 
enhancing firms’ performance and organisational efficiency in corporate leadership.  
Empirical studies on the banking sector provide mixed findings. Focusing on US banks, 
Aebi et al. (2012) and Berger et al. (2014a) do not find evidence of entrenchment theory. Pi 
& Timme (1993), Larcker et al. (2007) and Wang et al. (2012) show that CEO duality lowers 
bank performance; whereas Grove et al. (2011) and Pathan (2009) find evidence that it 
increases bank risks.  
In our paper we test the validity of the entrenchment theory that means that we expect 
the concentration of leadership (the presence of a dual CEO/chairperson) to result in lower 
bank efficiency. This is because duality can lead to increased agency conflicts since the 
board’s ability to monitor the CEO is reduced, which in turn infers that the CEO has 
increased power to influence board decisions and act in their own interests. As a result, loan 
quality is also expected to deteriorate as evidenced, for example, in Grove et al. (2011).  
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Hypothesis 3. (H3): The presence of a dual CEO negatively impacts bank efficiency and loan 
quality. 
 
Finally, we are interested in testing whether the frequency of meetings has any 
performance benefits in terms of efficiency and asset quality. The agency framework (Conger 
et al., 1998) suggests that there is a positive relationship between the number of board 
meetings and internal corporate governance and supervision, thus indirectly facilitating 
greater performance via reduced agency costs and lower risk taking. Adams and Mehran 
(2003) and Grove et al. (2011) observe that, compared to non-banking firms, banks require 
more frequent board meetings (in addition to larger and more active boards) because of their 
business complexity; however, once again, the empirical evidence for this assertion is mixed. 
For example, de Andres and Vallelado (2008) do not find a significant relationship between 
board meetings and bank performance, although Adams and Ferreira (2007) find the opposite 
result. For the Chinese banking sector, Liang et al. (2013) reveal that board meeting 
frequency as well as board independence improve both bank performance and asset quality. 
Therefore, we predict a positive relationship between the number of board meetings  and 
bank efficiency and loan quality. 
 
Hypothesis 4. (H4): A greater frequency of board meetings improves bank efficiency and loan 
quality. 
 
 
3.2 Testing the effects of ownership and CEO’s performance-related pay 
The differential effects of board characteristics on bank efficiency and risk are also 
examined empirically in this study according to three criteria that are deemed particularly 
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relevant for the Chinese banking sector: ownership concentration, state ownership, and CEO 
performance-related pay.  
The first criterion is ownership concentration. We discussed in Section 3.13 that duality 
of powers can result in entrenched management. In fact, this can also occur when high 
ownership concentration provides an incentive for the largest shareholder to extract control 
benefits and expropriate the wealth of outside or minority shareholders. Most East Asian 
markets, including China, are characterised by relatively high ownership concentration. This 
feature can impact banks’ internal governance, operations and performance via the 
entrenchment effect described in the previous section (see also Johnson et al., 2000 and 
Claessens et al., 2002). It is possible that in a market with weak investor protection, large 
shareholders are more influential over corporate decision-making and have more incentives 
to increase the level of risk taking. Evidence of this effect on the banking sector is found, for 
example, in Laeven & Levine (2009). In a study on China’s banks, García-Herrero et al. 
(2009) also report a negative association between ownership concentration and performance. 
However, concentrated ownership may also result in greater alignment with the interests of 
minority shareholders when controlling shareholders provide more effective internal 
monitoring – for example, by exercising greater control over executive compensation and 
management turnover as confirmed in Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Hartzell and Stark 
(2003), among others, for the non-financial sector; and Dong et al. (2014) for the Chinese 
banking sector. In comparison with developed markets, ownership structures in emerging 
economies are characterised by a much higher level of ownership concentration. Indeed, 
several previous studies tend to support the monitoring role of large shareholders since 
important external market mechanisms for disciplining managers, such as disciplinary 
takeovers, are significantly weaker for banks (Prowse, 1997).  
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The second criterion is state-owned versus private ownership. In this regard, it is worth 
noting that in the Chinese banking sector, the literature on the impact of board governance is 
relatively limited. The majority of studies typically concentrate on ownership characteristics, 
and distinguish between state-owned versus private banks and domestic versus foreign-
owned ones.
8
 Fu and Heffernan (2007), Lin and Zhang (2009), Zhang et al. (2012),  Jiang et 
al. (2013) and Dong et al. (2014) find that state-owned banks are less profitable, less 
efficient, and suffer from poorer asset quality compared to their private counterparts. In fact, 
a number of studies indicate that the prevalent high level of state ownership in Chinese listed 
firms weakens the corporate governance mechanism as it explicitly promotes the 
entrenchment effect (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Morck et al., 2000; Gul et al., 2011). This 
latter provides an incentive for the entrenched state shareholder to extract control benefits and 
expropriate the wealth of outside or minority shareholders. For the state-owned firms, the 
pursuit of political objectives increases conflicts of interest and inevitably affects operating 
performance and efficiency, as documented in various studies on the Chinese banking sector - 
for example, those by Chen et al. (2009), Berger et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. (2013). 
Furthermore, various authors have highlighted the importance for Chinese state-owned firms 
of alternative effects on performance via accrual and real earnings management (Kuo et al., 
2014). In this case, the manipulated performance is the result of stronger entrenchment 
effects (Yuan et al., 2007) and/or collusion with small audit firms (Wang et al., 2008). Hence, 
we expect that, in state-controlled Chinese banks, board characteristics will have no 
significant effects on efficiency, while could result in greater risk-taking activity mainly 
driven by lax risk management and excess lending. 
                                                          
8
 For example, Berger et al. (2009; 2010) provide evidence that foreign banks tend to be more efficient than (or 
approximately equally efficient to) private domestic banks. 
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Finally, the CEO compensation structure is another important mechanism to deal with 
governance problems (Brickley & James, 1987; Crespí et al., 2004; Caprio et al., 2007) and is 
our third chosen criterion. Compensation can reward or incentivise performance; but can also 
indirectly increase risk propensity. In theory, CEO compensations should be structured in 
such a way as to increase the alignment effect and act as an important incentive for top 
executives to enhance their mutual monitoring activities. Indeed, several recent studies 
focusing on the banking sector have shown that CEO compensation is positively associated 
with performance (for example, Ang et al., 2001 and Livne, 2013). That is, the 
implementation of CEO pay-for-performance schemes can mitigate agency problems and 
enhance internal corporate governance (Hall & Murphy, 2002; Core et al., 2003) and thus the 
effects of board characteristics can be less significant than in the case of those firms without 
such schemes. However, other recent studies have also warned of the positive association of 
these schemes with risk-taking activities (Chaigneau, 2013; Ravia & Sisli-Ciamarra, 2013).  
 
 
4. Methodology and data  
4.1 The model 
In this paper we examine the impact of board characteristics on the efficiency and risk-
taking activities of Chinese banks. We use the two-step system dynamic Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) approach with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors to control for 
potential instances of endogeneity (Blundell & Bond, 1998) and for the downward bias in the 
estimated asymptotic standard errors.
 
 The endogeneity problem arises because there is a 
possibility of reverse causality that certain board characteristics may be determined by 
performance (efficiency and asset quality) or that governance may be derived by underlying 
unobservable factors that impact performance. There are various sources of potential 
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endogeneity in corporate finance research as extensively discussed e.g. in Wintoki et al. 
(2012) and often empirical studies ignore the possibility that current values of governance 
variables are a function of past firm performance. As shown in the model specified in 
equation (1), we regress the profit and cost efficiencies and a risk-taking measure 
(alternatively in BER) on a set of board characteristics and control variables, as follows: 
 
8 13
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1 1
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 
               (1) 
 
where i identifies the cross-sectional dimension across banking firms, and t denotes the time 
dimension. 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the random error term, and BER is the dependent variable, which is 
alternatively profit efficiency (𝝅-eff), cost efficiency (c-eff) and traditional banking risk 
(NPLs). Efficiency levels are computed by estimating a stochastic translog cost function as 
described in Appendix B. Risk is traditional banks’ risk associated with lending, and is 
proxied by the level of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total loans
9
. In order to apply the 
dynamic Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) approach, we also include one lag of 
dependent variable, 𝐵𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡−1, in the regression. When BER is either profit or cost efficiency 
our instruments for the GMM estimation are one lag of the dependent variable and the NPLs 
ratio. Alternatively, when BER is the bank risk-taking variable, we use two lags of the 
dependent variable (NPL ratio) as instrumental variables.  
                                                          
9
 Chinese commercial banks adopt a five-category loan classification system. Under this system, bank loans are 
classified as performing loans (normal and special mention) and non-performing loans (sub-standard, doubtful 
and loss loans) based on their inherent risks. 
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We incorporate a vector of board characteristic B into our analysis that reflects size, 
composition and functioning. In order to explore whether board size (Bsize) has a non-
monotonic effect, we also add the squared value of the board size (SqBsize) in our model.  
For board composition, we test for the percentage of female (Femdir), foreign (Fordir), 
executive (Execdir) and independent directors (Bindep). The functioning of the board is 
explained by a dummy variable (Duality), which is equal to 1 if the CEO is also the 
chairperson or vice-chairman of the board; whereas Bmeeting is the number of board 
meetings held annually.  
In line with the previous literature, we also consider a set of control variables, Z, that 
includes bank-specific and macroeconomic factors that may affect a bank’s cost and/or profit 
efficiency level and risk-taking behaviour. Many studies have found that ownership 
concentration could significantly influence banks’ performance (e.g. Laeven & Levine, 2009; 
Omran, 2009; Dong et al., 2014). Therefore, in order to control for the impact of ownership 
concentration on bank efficiency and risk, we include two measures. The first (Largeshar) is 
the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. This shareholder has superior control 
rights so it controls the bank’s decision-making and operations. The second measure (HH2) is 
the Herfindahl index of the second- to the tenth-largest shareholders’ holdings. As an 
aggregate, HH2 represents a ‘combined’ block shareholder of ownership concentration that 
fulfils the very important function of counterbalancing the power of the first largest 
shareholder as they have incentives to monitor and restrain it directly. Therefore, the higher 
the concentration of shareholding in the hands of these large shareholders, the higher could 
be the efficiency of the banking firm, thanks to greater controls (Bai et al., 2004) and 
potentially higher competitive pressures.  
Several studies have shown that state-owned banks are often associated with lower 
efficiency (e.g. Fries & Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005), and greater risk taking (e.g. Iannotta 
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et al., 2013). Therefore, we include the variable Statecontrol which is set equal to one for 
banks whose largest (controlling) shareholder is a government agency or state-owned 
enterprise (SOE), and zero otherwise. Performpay is the dummy variable, which is set equal 
to one for banks with CEO performance-related compensation scheme, and zero otherwise, 
and List is a dummy that indicates whether or not a bank’s shares are publicly traded on a 
stock exchange. This variable is included in order to capture the fact that listing status may 
improve a bank’s efficiency and reduce excess risk taking because of the market discipline 
mechanism and the requirement for better corporate governance that is imposed when listing 
on a stock exchange (see Ray & Das, 2010). 
Concerning the bank-specific variables, Netloansta is net loans as a proportion of total 
assets, which measures the relative importance of the traditional banking business (de Andres 
& Vallelado, 2008; Aebi et al., 2012). The ratio of total shareholders’ equity to total assets 
(Equityasset) is used to measure banks’ solvency risk (Berger & Mester, 1997; Hughes & 
Mester, 2012).  To control for bank liquidity, we include the ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets (Liquidast) and the ratio of total loans to total deposits (Loandepr) (as, for example, in 
Wang et al., 2012). Totassets is the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets, which 
controls for size (Delis & Kouretas, 2011; Liang et al., 2013).  
At the macroeconomic level, we include the real GDP growth rate to account for the 
general economic environment in China over the sample period (Ferri, 2009). We also 
include a (Crisis) dummy variable to capture the potential impact of the financial crisis on 
efficiency and risk of Chinese banks. It takes the value of 1 for the years in the post-global 
financial crisis period (i.e. 2008-2011), and zero for the years before global financial crisis 
(i.e. 2003-2007). Finally, the time trend variable (Trend) is included in order to control for 
the effects of technical progress and other factors that might affect bank efficiency and risk-
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taking behaviour. Detailed definitions of the variables employed in the regressions are 
reported in Appendix A. 
As described in Section 3.2, we conjecture that board characteristics may have an 
incremental impact on efficiency and risk taking for those banks with high ownership 
concentration. To this end, we define a dummy variable, Concendummy, which is equal to 1 
if a bank’s Herfindahl index is greater than the median value over all banks and zero 
otherwise (ownership-concentrated vs ownership-dispersed). The Herfindahl ownership index 
that captures the level of ownership concentration for the ten largest shareholders is 
calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares of the first- to tenth-largest 
shareholders of the bank. Specifically, it is equal to  ∑ (𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑖)
2,10𝑖=1  where i=1,…10 and owni  
is the proportion of shares owned by the i
th
 largest shareholder.  We incorporate the 
interaction terms between Concendummy and the board characteristics explaining size, 
composition and functioning, into our baseline model (equation 1). Statistically significant 
coefficients will indicate a difference between the impacts of the board characteristics for 
banks with high and low ownership concentration. 
In a similar fashion, using the dummy Statecontrol, we include the interactions terms 
between state-controlled banks and the board characteristics into model (1) to test whether 
these latter have an incremental effect on bank efficiency and risk taking for this specific 
types of banks. Finally, to verify whether the impact of banks’ board characteristics on 
efficiency and risk is different for those banks with CEO performance-related compensation 
schemes, we also include interactions terms between the dummy Performpay, with the board 
characteristics into equation (1).   
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4.2 Data sources 
Detailed bank governance information was manually collected from the individual 
banks’ annual reports. Financial data were extracted from the international database 
BankScope. After excluding observations with missing accounting data, our final sample 
comprises 633 yearly observations covering 105 Chinese commercial banks over the period 
from 2003 to 2011. The sample comprises five large State-owned Commercial Banks 
(SOCBs)
10
, 12 Joint Stock Commercial Banks (JSCBs), 82 city commercial banks and seven 
rural commercial banks and, at the end of 2011, it represented approximately 74% of the total 
assets of the Chinese banking system. The descriptive statistics for the key variables of 
interest are reported in Table 2. The specific definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix A. 
 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
 
Panel A shows that the mean (median) profit efficiency levels, 𝝅-eff, are 66.2% (69.3%) 
ranging between 17.2% and 93.8%; while the mean (median) cost efficiency, c-eff, is 90.4% 
(91.3%) which is comparable with findings from other recent studies on the efficiency of 
Chinese banks (Berger et al., 2009) and, as expected, is considerably higher than the profit 
efficiency. Our chosen measure of risk is NPLs over total loans that averages out at around 
2.4% for the banks in our sample and peaks at approximately 20%. In the same table, panel B 
presents the summary statistics for board characteristics. It is possible to note that the average 
                                                          
10
 The Bank of Communications (BOCOM) used to be classed as a JSCB. However, it was much larger than the 
other JSCBs, and its shares were owned by a number of different state-owned entities. Therefore, in 2006, the 
CBRC redefined it as a SOCB thereby joining the Big Four (see footnote 2) to form “the Big Five”.  
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Chinese bank board comprises around 13 members, with boards with as few as four members 
and others with as many as 19. In addition, the average bank has around 10% female directors, 
4.4% foreign directors and nearly 26% executive directors. Finally, the typical bank has 
seven board meetings per year, although for some institutions this can reach 43 such 
gatherings. 
The model also includes selected bank-specific and macro-economic variables. 
Interestingly, the average Chinese bank has a level of net loans to total assets ratio, 
Netloansta, of around 50% and the variation is very small (only 10%).  
Table 3 presents Pearson pair-wise sample correlation coefficients for all our variables 
of interest. Some of these relationships are statistically significant and positive, despite being 
low, as, for instance, between profit efficiency and the proportion of independent directors 
and executive directors (0.09 and 0.08, respectively). 
 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Board characteristics, efficiency and risk: baseline models  
This paper’s primary goal is to analyse empirically the impact of alternative board 
characteristics on bank-specific efficiency levels as well as risk associated with lending 
activity measured by NPLs/Total loans. We employ the two-step system dynamic 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) with Windmeijer-corrected standard errors to 
address potential endogeneity issues. We first regress bank profit and cost efficiency on board 
size and a set of four variables describing board composition (namely female, foreign, 
executive and independent directors) and a set of two variables on board functioning 
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(CEO/chairperson duality and frequency of board meetings) separately. Then we test all 
board characteristics in the third model (column c). In all models, we include a squared term 
for board size to allow for possible non-linearities in the relationship with measures of 
efficiency and risk. As in the case of Berger et al. (2009) we consider profit efficiency as a 
better indicator of the quality of bank management compared to cost efficiency, the main 
reason being that profit efficiency includes both cost and revenue performance. Therefore, 
any qualitative differences in the results between the estimated profit- and cost-efficiency 
scores are attributable to differences in the banks’ revenue performance. 
As shown in Table 4, increases in Chinese banks’ board size seem to be associated with 
lower profit efficiency. In addition, with the only exception of the first model (𝝅-eff (a)), our 
evidence rules out significant non-linearities, thereby rejecting in most cases our hypothesis 
H1 on the quadratic relation between board size, efficiency and loan quality. Concerning the 
composition of the board, we find some interesting relationships and partial support for our 
second hypothesis H2, that the presence of more diverse and independent boards positively 
impacts bank efficiency and loan quality, although there are some exceptions. In particular, 
our evidence suggests that the inclusion of greater gender diversity on the board not only can 
improve banks’ profit and cost efficiency but can also lower risk, thereby giving full support 
to hypothesis H2a. The coefficients on the female director (0.901 in the profit model that 
includes all variables) are positive and economically significant for profit efficiency. For a 
bank with the median level of the proportion of female directors (7.7%), a one standard 
deviation increase in the proportion of female directors (i.e. 9.3%) leads to an increase in 
profit efficiency of 8.38%. These results corroborate the abundant literature on the finding 
that gender diversity of the board has a positive impact on bank performance (e.g. Gul et al., 
2011, Minton et al., 2011) and can reduce risk taking (Qian et al., 2015).  
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[Insert Table 4 around here] 
 
In contrast, we find mixed results in relation to the impact of a greater proportion of 
foreign directors on the board. The negative coefficient of Fordir in the first profit efficiency 
regression provides support to the arguments (Adams et al., 2010; Masulis et al., 2012) that 
foreign directors may not be familiar with the local systems. Consequently, they may not be 
able to exert effective supervision that may improve banks’ profit efficiency. However, this 
negative impact of foreign directors becomes insignificant when all board variables are 
incorporated and turns positive when tested against cost efficiency. These latter results 
therefore suggest that we find mixed results and only partial support for our hypothesis H2b - 
that foreign directors’ extensive experience and knowledge of foreign markets and 
networking abilities can enhance bank efficiency levels and asset quality.  
Furthermore, our evidence shows lack of support for our hypothesis H2c as we find 
evidence of a statistically negative relationship between the proportion of executive directors 
and both profit and cost efficiency while the coefficient for risk is insignificant. It is possible 
that the increase in insider directors on the board leads to the deterioration in the quality of 
the supervision of managers and an increase in conflict of interests among shareholders that 
in turn increases cost inefficiencies.  
Finally, we observe a significantly positive relationship between the percentage of 
independent directors and Chinese banks’ profit efficiency (hypothesis H2d). These findings 
are in line with previous studies (e.g. de Andres & Vallelado, 2008, and Liang et al., 2013) 
and indicate that profit efficiency can be improved by strengthening internal corporate 
governance mechanisms through greater board independence, although these impacts are 
statistically insignificant for banks’ cost efficiency and risk taking.  
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In relation to the variables explaining the functioning of the board, we find that the 
coefficients on Duality are negative and statistically significant in profit efficiency models 
(see, for example, Kaymak & Bektas, 2008 and Wang et al., 2012 for similar results). This 
means that the dual appointment of CEO and chairperson can exacerbate the agency problems 
and thus in turn reduce banks’ profit efficiency. Although these results seem to confirm the 
empirical prediction of our entrenchment hypothesis H3, the impact of duality on efficiency is 
not straightforward. This is because our models also yield a significant, albeit small, positive 
effect on cost efficiency levels, which supports the stewardship and organisational view of, 
for example, Anderson & Anthony (1986), that the dual appointment of CEO and chairperson 
of the board can help reduce information costs and improve the organisational efficiency of 
the board.  
Finally, the estimated coefficients explaining the frequency of board meetings are 
relatively small, although significantly different from zero, and seem to have an opposite 
impact on profit and cost efficiency. Overall, they do not appear to be an economically 
significant factor in explaining Chinese banks’ efficiency and risk taking activities. This 
means that we reject our hypothesis H4 that predicts a positive association between a high 
frequency of meeting and bank efficiency and risk-taking activities. 
For all models in Table 4, we also incorporate a set of control variables. Previous 
studies have documented that an increase in the size of the largest shareholder may weaken 
internal corporate governance and stimulate the expropriation of minority shareholders and 
earnings manipulation. By contrast, our results show that the coefficients on Largeshar in the 
majority of cases are statistically insignificant for both efficiency and risk taking.  In addition, 
we find that the nature of the controlling shareholder (i.e. state-owned vs non-state owned 
banks) appears to impact cost efficiency more than profit efficiency and risk.  
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Other findings from the estimations reported in Table 4 that are worth noting concern 
the bank-specific variables. The liquidity ratio (Liquidast), in particular, appears to impact 
negatively and significantly on bank efficiency, both on the profit and cost sides; and is also 
associated with higher risk-taking activity. Interestingly, banks that have a greater focus on 
traditional lending are more profit-efficient but incur higher costs as evidenced by the sign of 
the variable Netloansta. The level of capitalisation (Equityasset) and the ratio of loans to 
deposits (Loandepr) appear to significantly affect profit (cost) efficiency negatively 
(positively) but not risk; however, this latter seems to increase with size (Totasset is positive 
in all cases). 
Among the macro variables, the significant and positive Ecogrow coefficients indicate 
that Chinese banks’ profit efficiency is considerably higher when the economy is growing, 
while economic growth (and the global crisis) in China appear to have a negative impact on 
banks’ cost efficiency.11  
Overall, we find evidence that board characteristics generally exert more influence on 
banks’ profit and cost efficiency rather than risk does. As discussed above, one of the key 
findings of this study is the relative importance of the proportion of female directors on the 
board that appears to not only increase profit and cost efficiency significantly but also to 
reduce risk; and, at least as far as profit efficiency is concerned, the proportion of 
                                                          
11
 The p-values of AR(2) and Hansen tests are all greater than 0.1 for the third model with all board 
characteristics’ variables. Following Pathan and Faff (2013), we expect statistically significant AR(1) due to the 
way of construction and statistically insignificant AR(2). The Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions 
is statistically insignificant and this indicates that the instruments are valid in the two-step system GMM 
estimation. Overall, these imply that the model with all board characteristics’ variables is well fitted with 
statistically insignificant test statistics for both second-order autocorrelation in second differences (AR(2)) and 
the Hansen J-statistics. 
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independent directors. Our results are broadly confirmed when we estimate the efficiency 
scores using the value-added approach.
12
 They are also confirmed when we carried out the 
same analysis based on a subsample, which excludes the ten largest banks ranked by total 
assets.
 13 
 
5.2 Additional tests 
The effect of board governance features on bank efficiency and risk taking may vary 
between banks with different ownership characteristics and incentive structures. To test the 
incremental effect of different levels and types of ownership as well as CEOs’ pay-
performance incentives, we incorporate the interaction terms between the board 
characteristics and three dummy variables, Concendummy, Statecontrol and Performpay (see 
Appendix A for more details). 
Concentrated ownership has long been a defining feature of banks in emerging markets, 
in contrast to their counterparts in developed markets. Chinese banks provide a useful setting 
in which to investigate whether board characteristics have different impacts on their 
efficiency and risk-taking behaviour under such conditions. In particular, these differences 
should be more evident in China as the corporate governance and minority shareholder 
protection are relatively weak. To this end, we incorporate the interaction terms of board 
                                                          
12
 We also used the Herfindahl index of the largest to tenth-largest shareholders’ holdings into our baseline 
model as a robustness test, and the results are consistent. On the value-added approach, see for example, Berger 
and Humphrey (1997). Robustness tests results are omitted for brevity but available from the authors upon 
request.  
13
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that our results could be driven by the very large banking 
institutions in our sample. We re-run the baseline regression models based on a sub-sample that excludes them. 
Results are consistent with those for the full sample and are available from the authors upon request. 
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characteristics and the ownership concentration dummy, Concendummy, that equals 1 for 
banks whose Herfindahl index of top ten largest shareholders’ holdings is greater than the 
median, and zero otherwise. These interaction terms are used to test the incremental effects of 
board characteristics when ownership concentration is high. Panel (a) of Table 5 reports the 
results for all models (control variables are included in the estimation but not reported). It 
shows that there is some evidence of non-linear relationships between board size and 
efficiency for banks with concentrated ownership and state ownership but that the economic 
significance and magnitude of coefficients are very small.  
 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
 
Table 5 (panel (a)) also reveals that a greater proportion of independent and executive 
directors as well as CEO duality are associated with higher profit efficiency when banks’ 
ownership concentration is high. This provides evidence that in banks characterised by high 
ownership concentration there are aspects of board diversity that can help mitigate the 
negative effects of having powerful controlling shareholders, and that may result in gains on 
the profit side. It is intriguing that the incremental effect of a greater number of board 
meetings is positive on cost efficiency but negative on profit efficiency in more concentrated 
banks. This mixed evidence adds to the existing ambiguous literature on the effects of the 
frequency of board meetings for bank performance. Focusing on the cost side ((c-eff in panel 
(a)), the impact of the presence of more independent directors for banks with concentrated 
ownership is negative and significant when interacted (Bindep*dummy is  -.078).  
As discussed above, the ownership structure (state-owned versus non-state-owned) can 
also affect the performance of banks and their risk-taking propensity (see, for example, 
Berger et al., 2009 for a recent study on Chinese banks). In Table 5 (panel (b)) we re-estimate 
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our baseline model with interaction terms of board characteristics’ variables and the state-
owned dummy (i.e. a government agency or SOE controlled organisation). Our evidence 
points to three key results. First, we find some evidence of positive incremental effect of 
specific board characteristics on profit efficiency for state-owned banks and these correspond 
to those also found in panel (a) i.e. executive and independent directors. Second, these latter 
enter significantly the interacted variable Bindep*dummy both in the case of efficiency 
(positively) and risk (negatively). Third, for all models and with only few exceptions, most 
coefficients for non-interacted variables are statistically insignificant. In contrast, when 
variables are interacted with the state-owned dummy, they become significant particularly as 
far as the profit efficiency is concerned; while risk is, contrary to our expectations, seldom 
statistically significant. The general implication of these results is that the type of controlling 
ownership appears to drive the significant impact of board characteristics.  
Finally, we include the interaction terms of board characteristics and the CEO 
performance-related pay dummy, Performpay, to examine whether the adoption of the CEO 
performance-related compensation schemes affects their banks’ performance and/or risk-
taking activities. A performance-related CEO compensation package should provide 
incentives for top managers to focus on banks’ performance and growth and this, in turn, can 
further mitigate agency problems. However, it could also trigger short-termism and a greater 
risk-taking propensity thus resulting in a greater proportion of bad loans. Our findings are 
reported in panel (c)) of Table 5, and show that, contrary to the previous case of state-owned 
banks, the incremental effect of greater diversity on the board seems to be stronger for cost 
efficiency than profit or risk. In most cases, the effect when significant is negative, as for 
example for foreign, executive and independent directors. Interestingly, the presence of 
female directors manifests a positive and significant effect (at the 1% level) on cost efficiency, 
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while it has a negative effect on profit efficiency when a performance-related compensation 
system is applied.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The Chinese banking sector has undergone major reforms over the past two decades. 
Despite the extraordinary growth, the country is characterised by highly concentrated 
corporate ownership structures, particularly in the banking sector, and weak minority 
shareholder protection. Using manually collected governance data, this study analyses the 
impact of various board characteristics on the performance of Chinese banks from 2003 to 
2011. As far as we are aware, this is the first study to examine these effects on both profit and 
cost efficiency specifically for Chinese banks and to extend the investigation to the link with 
banks’ risk-taking behaviour.   
Our evidence suggests that board characteristics tend to have a greater influence on 
banks’ profit and cost efficiency than risk taking. A key finding of this study is that the 
proportion of female directors on the board appears not only to be linked to higher profit and 
cost efficiency but also to lower traditional banking risk. These results are consistent with the 
abundant literature that shows that greater gender diversity on boards has a positive impact on 
bank performance (Gul et al., 2011; Minton et al., 2011) and reduces risk taking behaviour 
(Qian et al., 2015). Likewise, our findings show that a higher level of board independence 
can also be associated with banks’ higher profit efficiency, while the opposite is found for 
executive directors and in the presence of dual leadership of the CEO/chairperson. Among 
the control variables, bank liquidity appears to be the most significant variable affecting both 
banks’ profit and cost efficiency (negatively in both cases) and increasing risk. This is an 
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important finding as in the aftermath of the global crisis prudential regulators are increasingly 
focusing on banks’ liquidity to complement minimum capital requirements. 
When we examine the effects for banks with different ownership structures, we find 
that one of the key differences across the two types of ownership structure is the impact on 
profit efficiency.  Specifically, we find that the incremental effects of board governance 
structures for banks characterised by concentrated ownership when significant are usually 
positive (as in the case of executive and independent directors), whereas results for risk are 
always insignificant. Our evidence also reveals that the same two specific board composition 
variables have a positive incremental impact on profit efficiency in the case of state owned 
banks. Interestingly, for banks with CEO performance-related pay the effect on efficiency 
when significant is usually negative.  
With increased competitive pressures as a result of the changes in the social financial 
model, there is no doubt that Chinese banks need to become more profitable and cost-
effective while improving their internal controls and risk management systems. This is a 
problem also faced by banks operating in other emerging markets characterised by similar 
environmental conditions such as a high level of ownership concentration and state controls 
combined with underdeveloped legal systems and weak minority shareholder protection. 
Although in recent years a range of modern corporate governance mechanisms for banking 
institutions has been introduced in China, there are still a number of challenges ahead. The 
findings in this paper offer useful insights to policy makers charged with the task of 
reforming the banking sector in emerging markets. 
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Table 1  
Board composition of selected Chinese commercial banks (end of 2013) 
Bank  Type of 
bank 
No. of board 
directors  
Foreign 
directors  
Female 
directors   
Executive 
directors  
Independent 
directors  
Agricultural Bank of 
China 
SOCB 15 2  
(13%) 
0  
(0%) 
4  
(27%) 
5  
(67%) 
China Construction 
Bank 
SOCB 12  2  
(17%) 
4  
(33%) 
2  
(17%) 
5  
(42%) 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank  
JSCB 18 0  
(0%) 
1  
(6%) 
4  
(27%) 
7  
(39%) 
Industrial Bank  JSCB 15 3 
(2%) 
1 
(7%) 
5  
(33%) 
5  
(33%) 
China Zheshang 
Bank 
JSCB 16 0  
(0%) 
4  
(25%) 
2  
(12.5%) 
4  
(25%) 
Bank of Ningbo  CCB 18 2  
(11%) 
2  
(11%) 
2  
(11%) 
6 
(33%) 
Bank of Guangzhou CCB 9 1  
(11%) 
0  
(0%) 
4  
(%) 
0  
(0%) 
Fudian Bank CCB 11 0  
(%) 
2  
(18%) 
4  
(36%) 
3  
(27%) 
Source: Individual banks’ annual reports (2013). 
Notes: SOCB=State--owned Commercial Bank; JSCB=Joint Stock Commercial Bank; CCB=City Commercial 
Bank. The proportion of each type of director on the board is reported in brackets.  
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Table 2 Summary statistics (pooled data 2003-2011) 
Variable 
 
Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 Max 
Panel A Bank efficiency and risk variables  
𝝅-eff  0.662 0.165 0.172 0.551 0.693 0.796 0.938 
c-eff  0.904 0.039 0.709 0.886 0.913 0.93 0.976 
NPLs / Total Loans
a
  0.024 0.027 0.000 0.008 0.014 0.028 0.200 
Panel B Board size, composition and functioning 
Bsize  12.780 3.223 4.000 11.000 13.000 15.000 19.000 
Femdir  0.099 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.077 0.167 0.429 
Fordir  0.044 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.067 0.462 
Execdir  0.258 0.113 0.000 0.176 0.267 0.308 0.800 
Bindep  0.191 0.127 0.000 0.083 0.200 0.313 0.444 
Duality  0.101 0.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Bmeeting  7.104 4.492 1.000 4.000 6.000 8.000 43.000 
Panel C Control variables 
Largeshar  0.230 0.181 0.040 0.110 0.190 0.260 1.000 
HH2  0.036 0.029 0.000 0.017 0.028 0.047 0.25 
Concendummy  0.490 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Performpay  0.697 0.46 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Statecontrol  0.532 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
List  0.150 0.357 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Netloansta  0.501 0.100 0.038 0.447 0.510 0.572 0.743 
Equityasset  0.060 0.022 0.004 0.046 0.058 0.069 0.16 
Liquidast  0.257 0.107 0.035 0.179 0.24 0.32 0.668 
Loandepr  0.646 0.116 0.206 0.580 0.660 0.719 1.098 
Totassets  10.842 1.766 7.665 9.638 10.374 11.751 16.101 
Ecogrow  0.107 0.017 0.092 0.093 0.101 0.113 0.142 
Crisis  0.627 0.484 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. 𝝅-eff and c-eff are estimated using stochastic frontier 
methodology as explained in Appendix B. The total number of bank observations is 633.  
a
 Since we include in our sample newly established banks (e.g. Zheshang Commercial Bank) that did not report 
any NPLs in the first 1-2 years, the minimum of this ratio is zero. 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 (1) 𝝅-eff 1                        
 (2) c-eff -0.15* 1                       
 (3) NPLs -0.04 0.01 1                      
 (4) Bsize 0.07 0.08 0.12* 1                     
 (5) Bsize_2 0.07 0.07 0.10* 0.99* 1                    
 (6) Femdir 0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.16* -0.15* 1                   
 (7) Fordir 0.06 0.06 0.20* 0.49* 0.50* -0.10* 1                  
 (8) Execdir 0.08* -0.14* 0.09* 0.15* 0.17* -0.03 0.27* 1                 
 (9) Bindep 0.09* -0.03 0.01 0.17* 0.17* 0.02 0.13* 0.22* 1                
(10) Duality 0.03 0.09* 0.25* 0.35* 0.35* -0.02 0.43* 0.15* 0.07 1               
(11) Bmeeting 0.13* -0.07 -0.05 -0.31* -0.30* 0.08* -0.27* -0.09* -0.01 -0.11* 1              
(12) Largeshar -0.08 -0.03 0.11* -0.19* -0.18* -0.12* 0.03 -0.09* 0.09* 0.23* 0.22* 1             
(13) Netloansta 0.00 0.22* -0.18* 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.12* 1            
(14 )Loandepr -0.09* 0.34* -0.12* 0.13* 0.15* -0.02 0.11* -0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 -0.11* 0.82* 1           
(15) Toasset 0.10* 0.04 0.21* 0.53* 0.55* -0.12* 0.55* 0.27* 0.15* 0.63* -0.09* 0.27* -0.03 0.11* 1          
(16) Equityasset -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.11* 0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.04 -0.19* 1         
(17) Liquidast 0.01 -0.10* 0.15* -0.13* -0.13* 0.08* 0.06 0.00 -0.09* -0.11* 0.03 -0.05 -0.51* -0.46* -0.16* 0.17* 1        
(18) HH2 -0.07 -0.13* -0.05 -0.09* -0.10* -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.10* 0.05 0.01 -0.12* -0.12* 0.03 0.06 0.07 1       
(19) Concendummy -0.09* -0.02 0.05 -0.25* -0.25* -0.09* 0.03 -0.07 0.13* 0.17* 0.11* 0.60* -0.15* -0.11* 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.37* 1      
(20) Performpay 0.02 0.11* 0.20* 0.16* 0.16* -0.01 0.34* 0.11* 0.04 0.24* -0.18* -0.08 0.05 0.14* 0.19* 0.10* 0.05 0.03 0.03 1     
(21) Statecontrol 0.03 0.09* 0.00 -0.07 -0.08* 0.01 -0.28* -0.12* 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.12* -0.02 -0.09* -0.06 0.00 -0.11* 0.02 0.09* -0.18* 1    
(22) Ecogrow 0.06 0.07 -0.26* -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.17* -0.09* -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.18* 0.14* -0.12* -0.21* -0.23* -0.05 0.00 -0.18* 0.07 1   
(23) Crisis -0.02 -0.08* 0.33* 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.23* 0.12* 0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.03 -0.28* -0.21* 0.05 0.36* 0.39* 0.07 0.00 0.26* -0.13* -0.81* 1  
(24) List 0.05 0.07 0.08* 0.47* 0.52* -0.05 0.48* 0.29* 0.05 0.53* -0.20* 0.07 0.14* 0.23* 0.71* -0.14* -0.11* -0.09* -0.05 0.23* -0.06 0.00 -0.03 1 
Note:  All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The sample period is between 2003 and 2011. * p<0.05 
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Table 4 Board characteristics, bank efficiency and risk in Chinese banks (2003-2011) 
Dependent 
Var (DEP) 
Profit Efficiency Cost Efficiency Non-Performing Loans /Total Loans 
𝝅-eff (a) 𝝅-eff (b) 𝝅-eff (c) c-eff (a) c-eff (b) c-eff (c) NPLs (a) NPLs (b) NPLs (c) 
Lag DEP -0.114*** -0.083*** -0.117*** -0.005 0.026 -0.005 0.905*** 1.047*** 0.914*** 
 (-4.210) (-3.894) (-4.159) (-0.117) (0.851) (-0.100) (3.782) (6.979) (3.239) 
Bsize 
-0.052**  -0.021 0.012  0.009 0.006  0.017 
 (-2.087)  (-0.771) (1.575)  (1.122) (0.198)  (0.516) 
Sqbsize 0.003***  0.001 -0.000*  -0.000 -0.000  -0.001 
 (2.718)  (1.097) (-1.670)  (-1.229) (-0.338)  (-0.596) 
Femdir 0.914***  0.901*** 0.104***  0.156*** -0.561***  -0.694*** 
 (3.842)  (3.973) (3.100)  (4.143) (-3.252)  (-2.636) 
Fordir -0.447**  -0.195 0.174***  0.138** -0.068  -0.094 
 (-2.481)  (-0.857) (3.354)  (2.317) (-0.489)  (-0.620) 
Execdir -0.536***  -0.351** -0.110***  -0.096*** -0.008  0.045 
 (-4.809)  (-2.559) (-5.977)  (-4.508) (-0.124)  (0.420) 
Bindep 0.239**  0.323*** -0.019  0.012 -0.077  -0.056 
 (2.406)  (3.079) (-1.289)  (0.751) (-1.085)  (-0.702) 
Duality  -0.249*** -0.154***  0.026*** 0.024**  0.017 -0.005 
  (-8.268) (-4.010)  (4.371) (2.468)  (1.545) (-0.158) 
Bmeeting  0.008*** 0.002  -0.002*** -0.001**  0.002 -0.003 
  (5.467) (1.185)  (-4.707) (-2.113)  (0.942) (-0.780) 
Largeshar -0.103 -0.221*** -0.160 0.032* -0.011 0.019 0.133 0.027 0.157 
 (-1.057) (-2.789) (-1.500) (1.684) (-0.580) (1.040) (1.291) (0.425) (1.297) 
HH2 1.123** 0.425 0.704 0.325** 0.276*** 0.159 0.652 -0.186 0.905 
 (2.239) (1.289) (1.619) (2.226) (2.647) (1.059) (1.042) (-0.553) (1.245) 
Performpay -0.062** -0.113*** -0.059* 0.006 0.001 -0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.017 
 (-2.148) (-3.955) (-1.890) (0.803) (0.140) (-0.985) (-0.128) (-0.351) (-0.547) 
Statecontrol 0.012 0.004 0.016 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.034*** -0.034 -0.012 -0.040 
 (0.540) (0.125) (0.675) (3.947) (6.309) (4.335) (-1.552) (-0.991) (-1.618) 
List -0.043 0.075** 0.007 0.003 0.024** 0.011 -0.044 -0.060 -0.017 
 (-0.588) (2.109) (0.098) (0.148) (2.348) (0.531) (-0.687) (-1.294) (-0.193) 
Netloansta 0.208 0.781*** 0.424** -0.196*** -0.148*** -0.181*** 0.361 0.150 0.519 
 (1.003) (4.925) (2.360) (-4.568) (-4.436) (-4.122) (1.259) (0.846) (1.253) 
NPLs -0.526*** -0.046 -0.307* -0.112*** 0.147*** -0.032    
 (-2.832) (-0.282) (-1.665) (-2.964) (5.681) (-0.597)    
Equityasset -3.112*** -3.400*** -3.286*** 0.705*** 0.910*** 0.782*** 0.251 0.308 0.436 
 (-6.961) (-5.959) (-6.501) (6.411) (8.248) (6.540) (0.424) (0.749) (0.566) 
Liquidast -0.520*** -0.350*** -0.475*** -0.048 -0.130*** -0.072** 0.309** 0.238*** 0.339** 
 (-3.638) (-3.018) (-2.968) (-1.593) (-7.597) (-2.147) (2.481) (2.804) (2.230) 
Loandepr -1.151*** -1.218*** -1.126*** 0.383*** 0.233*** 0.320*** -0.030 0.027 -0.194 
 (-9.578) (-7.982) (-8.082) (9.741) (7.412) (7.283) (-0.160) (0.268) (-0.678) 
Totasset -0.020 0.001 -0.035* -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.035** 0.021* 0.040* 
 (-1.220) (0.096) (-1.925) (-0.886) (-0.694) (-1.345) (2.137) (1.645) (1.838) 
Ecogrow 1.868*** 1.880*** 1.450** -0.545*** -0.208*** -0.358*** 0.232 0.023 0.303 
 (3.382) (5.709) (2.495) (-5.358) (-2.776) (-2.965) (0.692) (0.104) (0.766) 
Crisis 0.027 0.036** 0.005 -0.035*** -0.023*** -0.027*** 0.012 0.004 0.014 
 (1.036) (2.331) (0.195) (-6.546) (-4.774) (-4.605) (0.598) (0.294) (0.586) 
Trend 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.004** 0.003** 0.003** -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 
 (4.656) (7.851) (4.263) (2.568) (2.436) (2.170) (-0.266) (-1.376) (-0.329) 
Constant 1.819*** 1.057*** 1.707*** 0.740*** 0.798*** 0.779*** -0.624** -0.371** -0.751** 
 (7.480) (5.189) (5.518) (10.729) (23.035) (10.298) (-2.153) (-2.146) (-1.994) 
Obs 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 
AR(1) 0.053 0.013 0.041 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.018 0.045 
AR(2) 0.075 0.174 0.108 0.731 0.499 0.475 0.758 0.796 0.991 
Hansen 0.819 0.821 0.786 0.704 0.472 0.612 0.875 0.792 0.917 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated by the two-step system GMM estimator with 
Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors (reported in brackets). The p values of AR(1), AR(2) and the Hansen test statistics 
of over-identifying restrictions are also reported; *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 5 Board characteristics, bank efficiency and risk in Chinese banks by ownership and 
performance-related CEO compensation (2003-2011) 
 
Dependent variables  
(DEP) 
Panel (a) 
Ownership concentration 
 
Panel (b) 
State-owned 
 
Panel (c) 
Banks with CEO 
performance-related pay 
Interaction dummies: Concendummy 
(1= concentration > median) 
Statecontrol 
(1=state-owned) 
Performpay 
(1=pay-performance scheme) 
VARIABLES 𝝅-eff c-eff NPLs 𝝅-eff c-eff NPLs 𝝅-eff c-eff NPLs 
Lag of DEP 
-0.087** -0.044 0.162 -0.024 -0.081 0.295* -0.058 -0.166*** 0.419* 
 (-2.165) (-0.740) (0.657) (-0.629) (-1.583) (1.715) (-1.351) (-3.065) (1.668) 
Bsize 
0.110*** 0.021* 0.032 -0.146*** 0.044*** 0.119 -0.028 -0.005 0.117* 
 (2.723) (1.931) (0.788) (-2.979) (2.908) (1.484) (-0.283) (-0.270) (1.953) 
Sqbsize -0.003* -0.001** -0.002 0.006*** -0.001*** -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.005* 
 (-1.908) (-2.005) (-1.057) (3.039) (-2.586) (-1.642) (0.351) (0.485) (-1.749) 
Femdir 0.885* 0.154* -0.005 1.303*** 0.060 -1.043 3.950*** -0.605*** -0.076 
 (1.706) (1.884) (-0.010) (3.938) (0.636) (-1.621) (5.455) (-2.756) (-0.093) 
Fordir 0.148 0.164 0.287 -0.238 0.028 -0.451 0.383 0.239 1.907* 
 (0.300) (1.636) (0.928) (-0.603) (0.324) (-1.074) (0.354) (1.284) (1.740) 
Execdir -1.159*** -0.180*** 0.043 -0.405 -0.034 0.386 -0.242 0.059 0.299 
 (-4.675) (-2.809) (0.208) (-1.251) (-0.641) (1.333) (-0.636) (0.633) (1.135) 
Bindep -0.462** 0.081*** -0.117 0.277** 0.025 -0.072 0.088 0.180*** -0.184 
 (-2.408) (2.760) (-0.740) (2.095) (0.813) (-0.552) (0.525) (4.396) (-1.231) 
Duality -0.322*** 0.003 -0.036 0.096 0.011 -0.049 -0.201 0.142 0.136 
 (-3.866) (0.156) (-0.634) (1.363) (0.529) (-0.785) (-0.325) (1.274) (0.347) 
Bmeeting 0.015*** -0.004** 0.009 0.006 -0.005*** 0.002 0.013*** -0.006*** 0.005 
 (2.688) (-2.424) (1.561) (0.911) (-3.473) (0.570) (2.739) (-3.171) (0.929) 
Bsize*dummy -0.025 -0.010** 0.000 0.266*** -0.045** -0.089 -0.077 0.037** -0.113 
 (-1.280) (-2.343) (0.029) (4.275) (-2.197) (-1.319) (-0.763) (2.246) (-1.572) 
Sqbsize*dummy -0.001 0.001** -0.000 -0.010*** 0.001 0.004* 0.002 -0.001** 0.004 
 (-0.609) (2.390) (-0.113) (-4.087) (1.251) (1.784) (0.556) (-2.169) (1.391) 
Femdir*dummy 0.360 -0.041 0.181 -1.009* 0.025 0.770 -3.076*** 0.673*** 0.479 
 (0.679) (-0.399) (0.330) (-1.857) (0.192) (1.221) (-4.410) (3.142) (0.616) 
Fordir*dummy -0.616 -0.117 -0.378 -0.389 0.038 0.562 0.641 -0.342** -1.735* 
 (-1.272) (-1.186) (-0.969) (-0.686) (0.239) (1.266) (0.676) (-2.070) (-1.805) 
Execdir*dummy 1.483*** 0.100 -0.369 0.813* -0.085 -0.586 0.407 -0.298*** -0.770** 
 (3.810) (1.062) (-0.879) (1.694) (-1.055) (-1.500) (1.000) (-2.806) (-2.447) 
Bindep*dummy 1.175*** -0.078** 0.192 0.744** 0.127** -0.406** 0.075 -0.276*** 0.166 
 (5.696) (-2.066) (0.924) (2.498) (2.237) (-2.205) (0.417) (-4.347) (0.753) 
Duality*dummy 0.407*** 0.023 0.114 -0.500*** 0.012 0.179 0.142 -0.151 -0.101 
 (3.098) (0.673) (1.162) (-2.936) (0.422) (0.998) (0.227) (-1.332) (-0.241) 
Bmeeting*dummy -0.012** 0.007*** -0.001 0.006 0.005*** -0.002 -0.025*** 0.007*** 0.002 
 (-2.097) (3.221) (-0.235) (0.797) (2.843) (-0.456) (-4.019) (3.562) (0.281) 
Constant 1.049*** 0.801*** -1.344* 2.495*** 0.669*** -1.769** 1.545** 0.899*** -1.315* 
 (2.836) (6.710) (-1.724) (7.107) (5.458) (-2.236) (2.523) (5.377) (-1.783) 
Obs 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 527 
AR(1) 0.010 0.014 0.199 0.014 0.091 0.133 0.051 0.138 0.052 
AR(2) 0.149 0.216 0.652 0.545 0.342 0.388 0.710 0.538 0.391 
Hansen 0.950 0.934 0.673 0.972 0.975 0.942 0.799 0.916 0.533 
Note: All variables are as defined in Appendix A. Control variables are included (coefficients are not reported).  The 
models are estimated by the two-step system GMM estimator with Windmeijer’s (2005) corrected standard errors 
(reported in brackets). The p values of AR(1), AR(2) and the Hansen test statistics of over-identifying restrictions are 
also reported; *,**,*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
Sources 
 Dependent variables   
𝝅-eff Estimated alternative profit efficiency  Equation (B1) 
c-eff Estimated cost efficiency  Equation (B1) 
NPLs Non-performing loans to total loans Annual Reports 
BankScope 
Board governance variables    
Bsize  The total number of directors on the board  Annual Reports 
Femdir The proportion of female directors on the board Annual Reports 
Fordir The proportion of foreign directors on the board Annual Reports 
Execdir The proportion of executive directors on the board Annual Reports 
Bindep The proportion of independent directors on the board Annual Reports 
Duality  A dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman or Vice 
Chairman of the Board, and 0 otherwise  
Annual Reports 
Bmeeting The number of board meetings per year Annual Reports 
 
Other control variables  
Largeshar The percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder   Annual Reports 
HH2 Herfindahl index of the second- to tenth-largest shareholders’ holdings Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Performpay CEO performance-related pay dummy which is set equal to one for banks 
with CEO performance-related compensation schemes, and 0 otherwise. 
Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Concendummy A dummy variable that equals 1 for banks whose Herfindahl index of top ten 
largest shareholders’ holdings greater than the median, and 0 otherwise. 
Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Statecontrol A dummy variable that equals 1 for banks whose largest (controlling) 
shareholder is a government agency or state-owned enterprise (SOE), and 0 
otherwise. 
Annual Reports  
List A dummy variable that equals 1 for banks that are listed in the exchanges, and 
0 otherwise. 
Annual Reports 
Netloansta Ratio of net loans to total assets Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Equityasset Ratio of total equity to total asset, measuring the bank’s capital adequacy  Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Liquidast Ratio of total liquidity assets to total assets, measuring bank liquidity  Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Loandepr Ratio of total loans to total funding, measuring the bank’s liquidity risk 
exposure 
Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Totassets The natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets, which controls for bank size Annual Reports 
Bankscope 
Ecogrow Annual growth rate of GDP. World Bank 
Financial Indicators  
Crisis A dummy variable that equals 1 for the years post-global financial crisis 
(2008-2011), and 0 otherwise. 
n/a 
Trend Time trend, which is set to 1 for the first year under study (2003), 2 for the 
second year (2004), and so on, up to 9 for the last year (2011).  
n/a  
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Appendix B Measurement of profit and cost efficiency  
 
We estimate the efficiency levels of Chinese banks using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). We 
adopt the transcendental logarithmic (translog) form, which is the most commonly used functional 
form in the bank efficiency literature, to specify the frontier. Our empirical cost frontier model is as 
follows: 
2
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       (B1) 
where the dependent variable is alternatively either TCit  - the observed total costs,  or APE - the profit 
before tax, of bank i at time t; yi and wi are vectors of output and input prices for the ith bank; Ei is 
the total equity of a bank, which is treated as a quasi-fixed input; T is the time trend used to capture 
technological changes; and ln NPL/TL is the natural logarithm of the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans.
1
 In addition, νit is a two-sided normal disturbance term with zero mean and variance  
and represents the effects of statistical noise; the inefficiency term uit is assumed to be half-normally 
distributed; α, β, γ, ψ, φ, λ, ξ, θ, κ, ρ, and η are the parameters to be estimated, and the standard 
symmetry restrictions, βnm= βmn and γjk = γkj, are applied. Finally, the total cost and input price terms 
are normalised by the last input price, in order to impose linear homogeneity of degree one on the 
input prices. The cost efficiency of a bank is defined as CEit = 1 / exp (u) and takes a value between 
0 and 1. Alternative profit efficiency (APE), proposed by Berger and Mester (1997), is estimated 
similarly to cost efficiency. We use profit before tax to replace the total cost variable as the 
                                                          
1
 We treat equity capital without any associated price as quasi-fixed in our frontier model because the level of equity is 
much more difficult to alter in the short run. It is used to control for insolvency risk and the different risk preferences of 
banks. We also control for asset quality by including ln NPL/TL directly into the profit and cost frontiers. See Berger and 
Mester (1997), Mester (1996, 1997), Altunbas et al. (2000) and Hughes and Mester (2012) for more details.  
2
v
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dependent variable, and the same independent variables as we used in the cost function (equation B1). 
The profit efficiency is given as APEit = exp (-u) and also takes a value between 0 and 1.  
This study follows the intermediation approach, suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977), to 
define the input and output variables. The approach treats a bank as an intermediary, which collects 
funds from savers and transforms those funds into profitable projects (loans and other earning assets). 
Accordingly, the inputs consist of the price of total borrowed funds (X1), total physical capital (X2),
 
and labour (X3). The outputs consist of total loans (Q1), other earning assets (Q2), and non-interest 
income (Q3)
2
. Note that the input variables are not explicitly incorporated into the cost (or profit) 
frontier model summarised in equation (B1) but are represented by the impact of their input prices 
(that is, personnel expenses to the number of employees, W1; other operating expenses to the book 
value of fixed assets, W2; and interest expenses to total borrowed funds, W3).  
 
 
                                                          
2
 Due to off-balance sheet items not being available for all Chinese banks, we follow previous studies and use non-
interest income to capture non-traditional banking business as proxy for OBS fee service (e.g. Rogers, 1998; Lieu et al., 
2005; Lozano-Vivas & Pasiouras, 2010).  
